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“[E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”1 John Rawls, 
an American political and moral philosopher, theorized that justice, 
establishes a society of citizens holding equal rights and duties within 
a democratic system. According to Rawls, “[o]ur exercise of political 
power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason.”2 Rawls’ statement reflects 
on our nation’s most firmly embedded and recognized principles: equal 
justice under the law.3 This principle, written above the main entrance 
to the United States Supreme Court, expresses the responsibility of the 
court to ensure that there is equal justice under the law for all.4 Yet, 
the United States criminal justice system has fallen short of this 
principle, contradicting former President Lincoln’s proposition that, 
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2 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (Columbia University Press, 2d ed. 2005). 
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“all men are created equal.”5 Since 1989, courts have exonerated more 
than 1,800 defendants for crimes they did not commit due to officers 
systematically framing innocent suspects based on tainted evidence.6 
The vast majority of these defendants identified as African American 
and Latino.7 The Central Park Jogger case demonstrates the ethical 
failures of the American criminal justice system and  underscores the 
conscious disregard of ethical prosecutorial discretion and police 
interrogation.8  
On April 19, 1989, a twenty-eight-year-old investment banker, 
Trisha Meili, was knocked down as she jogged in New York's Central 
Park.9 She was dragged into a ravine, repeatedly raped, beaten 
severely, and left helpless and bleeding from her wounds.10 
Pedestrians discovered her body hours later, and medical assistance 
saved Meili, despite her having lost eighty percent of her blood.11 She 
suffered a traumatic brain injury and was in a coma for twelve days.12 
Meili was never able to remember the events of the crime.13   
At the time of the tragic incident in Central Park, the crime 
rate in New York City was at an all-time high due to inner-city 
poverty.14 Deteriorating economic conditions, coupled with government 
budget cuts from welfare state initiatives, helped generate record 
levels of violent crime.15   Police and the Manhattan District Attorney's 
Office launched an extensive investigation in efforts to find the 
attacker.16 Detectives questioned about thirty Black and Latino male 
 
5 The Gettysburg Address, HISTORY (Aug. 24, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-
war/gettysburg-address. 
6 About The Registry, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx 
7 Ron Stodghill, True Confession of the Central Park Rapist, TIME (Dec. 9, 2002), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,397521,00.html 
8 The Central Park Jogger case is also referred to as the Central Park 5 case. 
9 Sandy Strickland, Trisha Meili, ‘The Central Park Jogger,’ Finds Healing In Sharing Her Story, THE 






14 The 1980’s, HISTORY (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/1980s. 
15 Id.  
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teenagers about their activities in Central Park during the time of the 
attack.17 Within forty-eight hours of the attack on Meili, detectives 
apprehended five Black and Latino boys.18 Police interrogated the five 
boys ranging from fourteen to sixteen years of age for prolonged 
periods of time.19 The five boys: Raymond Santana, Korey Wise, 
Antron McCray, Kevin Richardson, and Yusef Salaam, later became 
known as the Central Park Five.20 Officers interrogated each boy for at 
least seven hours. Officers questioned the boys, "What did you do to 
the lady?"21 "Who were you with when you raped the lady?"22  Officers 
yelled in their faces referring to them as "scumbag;" officers punched 
them in their chests, calling them liars; officers also grabbed their 
faces demanding "I want a story."23 The five boys were promised that 
they would go home if they confessed to the crimes they did not 
commit, so each of them narrated a story that implicated themselves in 
written statements and on videotape in the presence of their parents or 
other adult relatives, after being offered and refusing immediate access 
to lawyers.24 The media portrayed the five boys as rapists.25 Even 
though each boy was a juvenile, citizens across the city called for the 
death penalty.26  
In 1990, the prosecution arranged to try the five defendants in 
two separate trials to control the order in which certain evidence would 
be introduced to the court. Each trial rested on the five boys' 









24 Saul Kassin, False Confessions and the Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/01/opinion/false-confessions-and-the-jogger-case.html. 




26 Joanne Laurier, The Central Park Five: A story of injustice, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Dec. 12, 2012), 
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/12/12/cent-d12.html. 
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but instead, indicated a single unknown rapist.28 The leading evidence 
was each boys’ incriminating statement, which the jury accepted, 
despite significant discrepancies in their accounts of the events.29    
Prosecutors justified the inconsistencies, arguing that they were 
understandable in a situation where multiple individuals described the 
same event while seeking to minimize their individual role in the 
crime.30 For over a decade, the convictions were largely accepted as 
correct.31 However, this changed in 2002, when authorities were 
contacted by Matias Reyes, who was already serving concurrent 
sentences for multiple rapes, robbery and murder.32 Reyes confessed 
that he alone committed the crimes against Meili, and a comparison of 
his DNA against DNA recovered from a sock found at the crime scene 
revealed a match.33  Based on its investigation, the Manhattan District 
Attorney joined the defense’s motion to vacate the convictions of the 
young black men.34  
The Central Park Five case demands interrogation reform 
through constitutional amendment. There are lessons to be learned 
from this case that come from a legal and social discourse on minors as 
an underrepresented group in the criminal justice system. Part II of 
this note applies Antonio Gramsci’s philosophical framework to 
address the economic disparities that diminished the rights of indigent 
citizens. Gramsci’s framework theorizes that the criminal justice 
system, in light of cultural hegemony, plays a role in reproducing 
power relations between upper- and lower-class citizens in the justice 
system.35 Part III discusses why minors are susceptible to false 
confessions when interrogated by law enforcement and the lack of 
equal protection and due process protections afforded to minors. It also 








34 People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837, 845–47 (2002) 
35 I use Antonio Gramsci’s framework on cultural hegemony to show how the criminal justice system 
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scientific studies to highlight children’s mental and emotional 
development in the context of police interaction. Part IV discusses the 
importance of prosecutorial function, the role of cultural hegemony in 
prosecutorial discretion, and a historical perspective on equal 
protection in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the right to 
counsel cases.36 It also includes a theoretical application of Justice 
Stone’s footnote four to the Central Park Five as a “discrete and 
insular” minority group.37 Part V provides remedies to expand the 
protection of minors and considers how the equal protection clause can 
be used to expand the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel for 
minors.  
II. A GRAMSCIAN APPROACH TO THE WAR ON CRIME AND 
DRUGS 
 
Race and class play a significant role in the wrongful conviction 
of innocent Black and Latino teenagers. Through the historical context 
of socioeconomic disenfranchisement of race, class, and economics, it is 
evident that Blacks and Latinos are more likely to be arrested, 
charged, convicted, and sentenced to prison.38 Blacks comprise thirteen 
percent of the U.S. population but are the majority of innocent 
defendants wrongfully convicted and later exonerated compared to any 
other racial class.39 
During the 1970s and 1980s, trends took effect in the U.S. 
criminal justice system that eroded the equality of rights afford by the 
U.S. Constitution provided to indigent defendants.40 Such changes are 
illuminated within cultural hegemony.41 Italian philosopher Antonio 
Gramsci coined the term cultural hegemony as the ideological basis for 
 
36 Many historical cases pertaining to equal protection were known as “warren court” cases.  
37 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
38 About The Registry, supra note 6. 
39 Id. 
40 KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE WAR ON CRIME AS HEGEMONIC STRATEGY: A NEO-
MARXIAN THEORY OF THE NEW PUNITIVENESS IN U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 61-87 (SAGE Publications 
Inc. 2000). 
41 KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
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the domination of a ruling class.42 He stated that cultural hegemony 
describes how the state and ruling capitalist class, the bourgeoisie, use 
cultural institutions to maintain power in capitalist societies.43 He 
asserted that the ruling class capitalist maintains control, not just 
through violence and political and economic coercion, but also through 
ideology.44 Gramsci's contribution underscores Marxism—a theory on 
power relations in capitalism where the ruling capitalist class, (the 
bourgeoisie), use cultural institutions to maintain power (control the 
process of production) in capitalist societies by exploiting the 
proletariats, working class citizens.45 Gramsci’s framework is essential 
in explaining a historical trend that created economic inequality 
leading up to the Central Park jogger case.  
The trend, the war on crime and drugs, was a response to the 
social challenges existing between the 1930s and 1960’s: The New 
Deal, Civil Rights Movement, the Women’s Movement, the Anti-war 
Movement, the Youth Movement, and the Welfare Rights Movement.46 
Each movement aimed to ameliorate economic inequalities, which 
derived from the Great Depression.47 The United States was 
considered a welfare state in an era called the “Warren Court.”48 The 
term “Warren Court” refers to the period in history of the Supreme 
Court during which President Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren as 
chief justice, who led the Supreme Court bench from October 5, 1953 to 
June 23, 1969.49 During this era, the Warren Court effectively ended 
racial segregation in U.S. public schools in ruling on Brown v. Board of 
Education and Copper v. Aaron.50 The rulings expanded constitutional 
rights of indigent defendants and introducing “one man, one vote” to 
ensure equal representation in state legislatures by applying the Bill of 
 
42 WALTER L. ADAMSON, HEGEMONY AND REVOLUTION: ANTONIO GRAMSCI’S POLITICAL AND CULTURAL 
THEORY (Echo Point Books & Media 2014). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 KARL MARX ET AL., THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Verso ed. 2010). 
46 BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 40. 
47 Id.  
48 Robert Longley, The Warren Court: Its Impact and Importance, THOUGHTCO., 
https://www.thoughtco.com/the-warren-court-4706521.  
49 Id. 
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Rights through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.51  
During the Warren Court, the U.S. Supreme Court also ruled on 
decisions that revolutionized the rights of indigent citizens, such as 
expanding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for citizens who were 
unable to afford legal representation.52 The Warren Court delivered 
additional landmark decisions that expanded the rights of citizens in 
criminal court.53 The  Court strengthened the Fourth Amendment 
protections by banning prosecutors from using evidence seized in 
illegal searches.54 The Court also required all persons interrogated 
while in police custody to be clearly informed of their right—such as an 
attorney—and acknowledging their understanding of those rights.55 
As previously mentioned, footnote 4 states the Warren Court’s 
guiding principle on equal rights.56 Three years later, the Supreme 
Court held in support of indigent citizens in Harper v. Virginia State 
Bd. Of Elections,57 where it terminated a poll tax that ran afoul of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because its 
stymied citizens from voting based on their economic status.58 The 
Court declared that “lines drawn on the basis of wealth or poverty, like 
those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”59  
The expansion of rights for indigent citizens ended during the 
1970’s, when President Richard Nixon proposed the war on crime and 
drugs.60 After Warren’s retirement, President Nixon replaced liberal 
justices with more conservative justices, which led to rulings that 
clearly changed the Court’s approach to indigent citizens.61 For 
instance, the Court upheld Maryland’s maximum grant rule that 
capped a family’s monthly benefits and also rejected a claim that this 
rule denied families with a large number of children equal protection 
 
51 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE (Oxford University Press 1996).  
52 Fare v. Michael C., 441 U.S. 707, 725 (1979);  
53 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.   
56 See The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 4. 
57 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 668 (1966). 
58 Harper, 383 U.S. at 668. 
59 Id. 
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under the law.62 The Supreme Court rejected close judicial scrutiny 
and reasoned that the claimant failed to demonstrate the shortcomings 
in the political process that would justify closer judicial review in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.63 However, white 
flight of affluent families after Brown and Rodriguez resulted in 
greater neighborhood poverty and racial isolation.64  
The Court refused to extend new rights to indigent citizens 
during the war on drugs and crime.65 The war on drugs was not only 
reactionary, but a hegemonic strategy to promote the interest of 
conservative politicians.66 Conservative politicians often united in 
opposition to social movements, which sought to expand reliance on 
welfare initiatives. By politicizing crime and demanding new policies 
that “get tough on crime,” these conservative politicians discredited 
welfare initiatives designed to eliminate poverty, racial injustice, and 
economic instability.67 The war on drugs policy in 1971 is an example 
of a ruling class’ hegemonic strategy to divest the state’s responsibility 
for social welfare and reinforce punitive crime prevention.68 Cultural 
hegemony was further manifested through President Reagan’s renewal 
of the 1980’s War on Drugs policy, causing “an enormous increase in 
drug-related (often minor offenses) crimes and a rapid expansion in the 
prison population of African-Americans and Latinos, levels far beyond 
that in any industrial country.”69  
These punitive anti-crime policies, stemming from the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, transformed the meaning of poverty.70 They  
legitimized the replacement of a “welfare state with a security state” 
 
62 Adam Cohen, The Enemy of Poor Americans, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 26, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/how-supreme-court-abandoned-poor/607060/  
63See infra 204. 
64 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted "avoiding racial isolation" and achieving a "diverse student 
population" in which race is one component are compelling interests. Parents involved in Cmty. Schs. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 797-98 (2007) ("This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its 
historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. A 
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and 
expertise, may choose to pursue.”). 
65 Cohen, supra note 62. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 40. 
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through the exchange of severe budget cuts in government spending 
for poverty relief and expansion of the nation’s penal apparatus.71 The 
act’s purpose was to target “major” drug traffickers responsible for the 
manufacturing or distributing of drugs notwithstanding the 
preexisting low crime rate on drugs.72 Sadly, their efforts were 
unsuccessful, instead it provided prosecutors broad authority to 
prosecute low-level users and dealers.73 Moreover, instead of allocating 
funds to reform initiatives, the Justice Assistance Grant Program 
distributed funding to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies 
that perpetuated arrests and incarceration rates.74 This also led to 
greater demands on the already overburdened and slow-to-adapt 
public defender system.75 This was shown through preexisting 
economic inequalities among citizens and punitive anti-crime 
policies.76 It also lead to more crime, which lead to indigent 
populations receiving lower quality of legal representation, and 
consequently, higher rates of conviction and longer sentences.77 These 
punitive policies created a metaphorical panopticon, where minorities 
are objects of investigation, judgment, and manipulation of a ruling 
class based on their race, class, and relationship to poverty.78 Given 
the increasing level of economic inequality and its reinforcement via 
the criminal justice system, the low quality of legal representation for 









75 JEFFREY REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY CLASS 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Pearson, 10th ed. 2016). 
76 Id. 
77 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (New 
Press 2010). 
78 MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200-02 (Alan Sheridan trans. 1977). The term panopticon is 
coined by Jeremy Bentham to describe the prison structure, but Foucault expands on the term to illustrate 
how inmates are controlled by always feeling under “inspection.” The term was introduced in Jeremy 
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III. THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF MINORS TO FALSE 
CONFESSIONS AND LACK OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
UNDER THE LAW 
 
The war on crime and drugs as a hegemonic strategy led to the 
abusive policing of residents in black and brown communities. Studies 
show that while youth incarceration has declined over the last decade, 
there has been an increase of racial and ethnic disparities in arrests.79 
There is no doubt that White teenagers are not excluded from police 
detention; however, Black and Latino teenagers are still arrested at 
higher rates and thus, are particularly at a higher risk of facing 
coercive police interrogations.80 The false confessions produced within 
forty-eight-hours led to the wrongful conviction of the innocent young 
suspects in the Central Park jogger case. Additionally, juveniles over-
represent false confession cases, typically accounting for about one-
third of the samples of adults and children. 81 The structure and 
function of a minor’s brain may affect the way that she or he processes 
and reacts to information and various stimuli.82 It is difficult 
for minors to regulate mood, impulse, and behavior because their brain 
is in a constant period of maturation.83 Minors are susceptible to the 
pressures of interrogation and demands from authoritative figures 
because the presentation of fabricated evidence would be risky for 
young suspects with low "social maturity."84  
One problem with modern interrogative techniques used during 
police questioning is that juveniles often exhibit behaviors that 
investigators are trained to associate with deception.85 Modern police 
 





83 Ian Lambie & Isabel Randell, The Impact of Incarceration on Juvenile Offenders, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
REVIEW 33, 449-456 (2013) 
84 Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Tales From the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard 
Police Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions From Juvenile Suspects, 20 
PERSPECTIVE IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 127-62 (2004). 
85 Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the Expectations of the 
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interrogation methods are accusatory, confrontational, isolative, and 
psychologically manipulative.86 Psychologist Deborah 
Davis observed that one of the primary goals of investigators is to "sell 
a confession" by leading suspects to believe confessing is the best 
choice under the circumstances.87 She stated that investigators tailor 
an attractive confession in four ways.88 First, the interrogation is a 
negotiation between officers and suspects where suspects still have 
control of their legal outcomes.89 Second, interrogators purport 
to have a suspect's best interests in mind.90 Third, interrogators 
establish criminal responsibility through other means, such as non-
existent physical evidence or witness testimonies.91 And fourth, 
interrogators present a confession as the best alternative for suspects 
to mitigate their chances of incarceration.92 
Moreover, interrogations are believed to be most 
effective when conducted in accordance with the Reid Technique.93 
The Reid Technique has two interrogative phases. 94  The first phase, 
called "behavioral analysis interview," is non-accusatory and designed 
for investigators to gather information about suspects, build trust and 
rapport, and determine whether the suspect is dishonest.95 Once 
investigators believe a suspect is guilty based on his verbal and 
nonverbal cues, they engage in the second phase.96 The second phase 
consists of additional steps that counteracts a suspect’s denial of 
criminal involvement, breaks their resistance, and tailors a  confession 
as an appealing alternative.97 Law and Psychology Professor, 
 
86 Id. 
87 Deborah Davis & William T. O’ Donohue, The Road to Perdition: Extreme Influence Tactics in the 






93 Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J AM ACAD PSYCHIATRY 




97 Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions: From Colonial Salem through Central Park, and into the Twenty-First 
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Dr. Richard Leo asserts that the primary goal of police interrogations 
is to obtain confessions from suspects, not necessarily to "find the 
truth".98 He also states the Reid Technique focuses on breaking down 
denial and resistance, without necessarily focusing on whether the 
interrogator intentionally elicits false confessions. 99 
  Moreover, distinguished Professor and Psychologist, 
Dr. Saul Kassin addressed three aspects of interrogations that are 
common to false statements: 1) physical custody and isolation: 
interrogations conducted in the absence of social support for protracted 
periods; 2) presentation of false evidence: lying to suspects about non-
existent evidence against them, and 3) minimization: police-originated 
scenarios that serve to minimize the severity of the crime and the 
suspect's culpability, making it easier to confess.100 Dr. Kassin further 
describes the interrogation as a trained interrogator overcoming the 
suspect’s objections as he protests his innocence.101  However, when 
police use these techniques on juveniles,  they are at a greater risk of 
providing false confessions due  to juveniles’ varying stages of 














98 Richard A. Leo et al, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 564-571 (1998). 
99 Id. 
100 Fare, 441 U.S. at 725. 
101 Id. 
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a. Laws and Science 
 
Federal Constitutional law, as applied to the states, regulates police 
interrogations in the United States.103 Two legal doctrines govern the 
admissibility of pre-trial confessions: the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause voluntariness standard and the Fifth Amendment 
Miranda doctrine.104 The harsh reality is that police interrogation 
practices often produce false confessions from minors irrespective of 
federal laws that attempt to regulate it.105 Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, a statement obtained from a suspect 
must have been made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion or 
inducement. The Supreme Court held in Brown v. Mississippi that the 
use of confessions at trial obtained through physical coercion violates 
the suspects’ fundamental rights of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.106 Minors are most susceptible to pressure from 
authoritative figures.107 This is shown through research, which found 
that minors are more compliant, open to suggestion, predisposed to 
social peer pressure, and more likely that an adult to agree to a false or 
inaccurate statement.108  
Sadly, the United States Supreme Court only 
first acknowledged the dangers of a minor providing a false confession 
in the 1948 case of Haley v. Ohio.109 In Haley, a 15-year-old African 
American defendant falsely confessed to a murder he did not 
commit.110 The defendant, John Harvey Haley, was questioned by law 
enforcement for five hours and was not allowed to see his mother or 
the lawyer she retained for him.111 However, a newspaper 
photographer was allowed to take his picture immediately after the 
confession.112 The lower court convicted Haley of first-degree murder in 
 
103 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
104 Id. at 436. 
105 Anthony J. Domanico, Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Overcoming Miranda: A Content 
Analysis Of The Miranda Portion Of Police Interrogations, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2012). 
106 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
107 Duncan, supra note 85. 
108 Id. 
109 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1947). 
110 Id. at 599. 
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state court.113 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the police 
obtained Haley's confession in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 
due process rights because evidence showed that force and coercion 
were used to extract Haley's confession.114 The Haley Court 
acknowledged that minors cannot be judged by the more exacting 
standards of maturity held to adults.115 They also encouraged reliance 
on child psychology in the criminal prosecution of minors.116  In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter expressed his view on child 
prosecution, arguing that, “[o]ur Constitutional system makes it the 
Court's duty to interpret teenagers’ confession based on an evaluation 
of psychological factors[.]”117   
The ability of minors to provide trustworthy statements must be 
considered in light of a child’s psychological developmental as well as 
the circumstances precipitating the confession.118 However, because of 
their mental developmental state, police interrogation tactics pose 
a specific threat to the accuracy of a minor’s confession. Courts will 
continue to hear cases like the Central Park jogger case unless law 
enforcement cease practices and procedures intended to extract 
confessions from minors.  
The Due Process voluntariness standard continued to evolve 
during the 1960’s, with Miranda v. Arizona breathing new life into the 
Fifth Amendment—right against self-incrimination.119 In Miranda, the 
Supreme Court recognized that coercive police tactics, although falling 
short of violating the Fourteenth Amendment, may nevertheless cause 
a suspect to incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.120 Under the Miranda Doctrine, a person in custody 
must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed by police of his four 
core Miranda rights: the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, 
the right of indigent arrestees to have an attorney appointed for them, 
and the acknowledgement that any incriminating statement made can 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 599. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 606. 
118 Domanico, Cicchini & White, supra note 105. 
119 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436. 
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be used against him at trial.121 A statement obtained from a suspect 
during custodial interrogation following provision of Miranda 
rights may be admitted at trial only if the prosecution demonstrates 
that the suspect "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily" waived 
his rights.122   
The Supreme Court decided its first Miranda case involving a 
juvenile defendant in Fare v. Michael, where a sixteen-year-old 
suspect’s request for his probation officer, at the onset of questioning, 
was held not to be an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent and request for an attorney.123 The Fare Court addressed 
whether a totality-of-the-circumstances approach surrounding 
interrogations is appropriate to ascertain whether the accused in fact 
knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his Miranda rights. The 
Court held the totality-of-the-circumstances approach was appropriate 
since it mandates inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation.124 This includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, 
experience, education, background, and intelligence.125 It also includes 
whether a juvenile has the capacity to understand the warnings 
given to him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the 
consequences of waiving those rights.126  However, in practice, courts 
rarely, if ever, consider whether a minor’s waiver was 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.127 This was the 
situation in the Central Park jogger case, when law enforcement 
interrogated each of the five teen boys twice: first on April 19th, 1989 
by police and detectives then second time two days later on April 21st, 
1989 when ADA Lederer recorded their confessions.128 Each of the five 
suspects waived their right to counsel, and the court held that each 
waiver was valid despite the boys not knowing the consequences of 
their waiver.129 Indeed, after the interrogation, the court acknowledged 
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123 See Fare, 441 U.S. at 727–28 (holding that a sixteen-year-old juvenile’s request for his probation officer 
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assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights and adopting the use of the "totality of the circumstances" approach). 
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that one of the suspects, Korey Wise, had a learning and intellectual 
disability that further impeded his ability to appreciate the 
consequences of a Miranda waiver.130 Despite Korey’s confession in the 
absence of counsel and his limited intelligence to voluntarily waive his 
Miranda rights, the Appellate Court concluded that his learning 
disability did not render him incapable of voluntary consent.131 The 
erroneous ruling on the trial and appellate level demonstrates the level 
of illegitimate differential treatment based on conscious racism and 
class bias.132 
Even if a suspect is informed his Miranda rights, the Supreme 
Court in Berghuis v. Thompkins held that waivers to Miranda can be 
implied in the absence of an explicit statement if the suspect’s words 
and actions implicitly constitute a decision to forego his or her 
rights.133 This allows police interrogators to merely read the Miranda 
warnings, and initiate an interrogation, reducing the formal 
requirement of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver in 
practice.134 How do courts measure intelligent? How can an individual 
intelligently waive Miranda if he or she cannot appreciate the 
consequences of their waiver? Voluntary confessions are necessary to 
the integrity of a criminal investigation if the suspect had the 
autonomy.135 It is almost never in a suspect’s rational self-interest to 
make incriminating statements, admissions or confessions to police, 
especially in the absence of DNA evidence.136 Police officers and 
detectives pushed and punched each of the Central Park Five boys. For 
example, one of the officers repeatedly called Raymond Santana a 
scumbag while another jabbed Antron McCray in the chest.137 Even if 
the boys waived their Miranda rights, the act of punching and name 
calling during hours of interrogation should shock the conscience of a 
judge, jury or any reasonable person because Due Process requires 
 
130 Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 845–47. 
131 See, e.g., Id. (reassessing the juveniles’ confessions of raping a Central Park jogger in light of new 
exculpatory evidence). In the Central Park jogger case, five teenagers ages fourteen to sixteen were convicted 
in 1990 of beating and raping a woman in Central Park, but their convictions were overturned when Matias 
Reyes, an adult, confessed to the crime in 2002. Id. at 840, 842. 
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criminal prosecutions be conducted in a manner in accordance with 
due process.138 The Supreme Court in 1952 established what it meant 
to shock the conscience in Rochin v. California based on law 
enforcement methods (forcing an emetic into defendant’s stomach) to 
retrieve evidence for narcotics.139 The Court established the shock-the 
conscience test based on the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit any 
conduct by government agents that falls outside the standards of 
civilized decency.140 Today, courts still apply this test to determine 
voluntariness, but they also consider  the totality of circumstances, 
including the suspect’s education, mental and physical condition, along 
with the setting, duration, and manner of police interrogation.141 Thus, 
evidence obtained in a manner is inadmissible, even if it does not run 
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment protections.142 
Miranda warnings continue to be of little or no avail for juvenile 
suspects.143 Due to their precarious mental states, they are less likely 
to provide a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of their 
rights. Decades later, Miranda warnings have not reduced the 
possibility of false confessions. Dr. Kassin observed the 
difference between Miranda rights and how law enforcement conveys 
Miranda warnings.144 In a laboratory experiment, seventy-two 
apprehended participants who were guilty or innocent participated in 
a mock theft. Participants were motivated to avoid prosecution at trial 
and were confronted by a neutral, sympathetic, or hostile male 
"detective" who sought a waiver of their Miranda rights.145 Later in the 
experiment, seventy-two other participants watched videotapes of 
these sessions and answered questions about the detective and 
suspect.146 The results showed that, although the detective's demeanor 
had no effect, participants who were truly innocent were significantly 
more likely to sign a waiver than those who were guilty.147 Believing in 
the power of their innocence to set them free, most waived their rights 
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even in the hostile detective condition, where the risk of interrogation 
was apparent.148 
Adding to the problem, although the Supreme Court specifically 
stated that police must communicate Miranda rights to detained 
suspects, it did not specifically state how police officers must convey 
the warnings.149 This results in high inconsistency on how 
Miranda warnings are communicated across the nation.150  Studies 
demonstrate that the content of Miranda rights on written forms are 
too complex for many suspects to fully comprehend.151 Therefore, the 
ambiguity of Miranda rights severely limits a juvenile suspect’s rights 
to remain silent and obtain counsel.152 In 2007, psychologists Rogers, 
Harrison, Shuman, Sewell, and Hazelwood conducted a study to assess 
the content, format, and complexity reading level of 560 Miranda 
warning forms used by different police departments across the 
country.153 They discovered that the analysis of the wording used in 
the forms required a reading level that varied between third grade and 
postgraduate education.154 A separate study of twenty-nine custodial 
interrogations conducted by Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
police officers revealed that the Flesch-Kincaid readability level for the 
entire warning was 10, indicating that individuals with a tenth-grade 
education should be able to understand most of its content.155 The last 
clause, which contains two parts of the warning, is critical in 
protecting a suspect’s right against self-incrimination, as it states the 
suspect’s right to end questioning at any time, remain silent, 
and request an attorney.156 Yet, the last two parts of the warning were 
rated 13 and 18.7 out of 0.0 (with 10.0-0.0 as the highest), indicating 
that suspects would need a college and postgraduate reading 
 
148 Stodghill, supra note 7. 
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comprehension level to understand the last two parts of the 
warning.157   
The accused, for a number of reasons, may be less prepared to 
understand a Miranda warning. Furthermore, factors such as race, 
class, and socioeconomic status influence the outcomes between 
minority children and law enforcement.158 Research  has consistently 
shown that racial and ethnic minorities, particularly Blacks and 
Latinos, compared to White suspects,  are overrepresented and 
experience harsher outcomes at every stage of the law enforcement 
process.159 The number of Americans living in poverty are 
disproportionately Blacks and Latino.160 Because African Americans 
and Latinos are disproportionately poor, their vulnerabilities are 
associated with lack of education, negative expectations of police 
interaction, limited English proficiency, and conflicting cultural 
expectations about law enforcement’s role and authority.161 All 
vulnerabilities contribute to an intensified sense of 
powerlessness.162  Lack of education may also cause development of 
intellectual disabilities.163  While the Central Park jogger case occurred 
when courts had yet to consider how neuroscience guides policy, 
intelligence is a significant factor in producing false confessions that 
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IV. THE POWER OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
a. The Abuse of Prosecutorial Discretion and Danger of 
Confirmation Bias 
 
 Some scholars have suggested that one of the reasons why 
ethnic minorities, particularly Blacks and Latinos, have the highest 
rates of wrongful convictions might be due to the heightened risk of 
confessing falsely, or otherwise, during criminal investigations.165 
Prosecutorial discretion produces racial inequality in the criminal 
justice system when prosecutors abuse their discretion. The Central 
Park Jogger case is a clear example of racial inequality that warrants 
a demand to expand equal protection.  
At every step of the criminal process, public stigmatization 
morphed the perception of all five suspects and created a presumption 
of guilt before any discovery of sufficient evidence.166 This is because 
cultural hegemony influences the perception of minority suspects, 
which in turn, effects important prosecutorial decisions. Likewise, the 
race and class of a victim, as compared to her alleged 
perpetrator, tends to impact how prosecutors exercise discretion at 
indictment hearings, plea bargaining, and sentencing stages.167 Also, 
prosecutorial discretion stems from the fact that prosecutors do not 
have a client.168 Instead, the prosecutor represents the state, which 
entails every individual who lives in the state they serve.169  
A prosecutor's relationship with the state involves a balance of 
conflicting goals.170  That is, confirmation bias influences prosecutorial 
decisions.171 For example, in the Central Park Jogger case, three sets 
of semen samples picked up from Trisha and the crime scene 
were all linked to a single person, and that person was not any of the 
 
165 Davis, supra note 162, at 15. 
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five boys who were wrongfully convicted.172 The prosecutors knew that 
at the time, despite the DNA evidence, they created an alternate 
theory where the real perpetrator got away and that each of the five 
boys was protecting the unknown, unnamed sixth individual.173 
Mike Sheenan, one of the lead investigators in the case, also knew 
that the DNA did not match the five juvenile 
suspects.174 Despite having access to DNA samples from other 
suspects, such as Matias Reyes, the actual perpetrator, Sheenan, failed 
to test preexisting DNA evidence from his case file.175 Sheenan and the 
Assistant District Attorneys made decisions that confirmed their own 
biases, depriving all five suspects of a fair and equal trial.176 
 
b. Equal Protection Considerations 
 
In order to reduce inequalities reinforced via the criminal 
justice system and prevent the outcomes similar to the Central Park 
Jogger case, the right to counsel must be expanded for minors. The 
right to counsel has roots in several Constitutional sources: The Sixth 
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Fifth 
Amendment Miranda Doctrine, and the Equal Protection Clause.177  
The Sixth Amendment provides the most direct statement of the 
right, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”178 In 
addition, the right to counsel is an essential element of due process. In 
Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court expanded the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, by holding the right to counsel as a 
fundamental right that applies to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.179 Indigent clients would be 
guaranteed competent counsel for not just in capital and felony cases, 
but also for low-level crimes.180 
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In Messiah v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a 
suspect was entitled to the right to counsel upon indictment. 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court held a suspect’s right to counsel 
attaches and a suspect is entitled to counsel as soon as judicial 
proceedings have been commenced against him or her; whether by 
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or 
arrangement.181 At that point, police cannot interrogate a suspect 
about matters relating to those proceedings absent to an explicit 
waiver of the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to legal representation. 
In 1967, a few years after Gideon and Messiah, in In Re Gault, the 
Supreme Court held the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied to juvenile defendants and adults.182 It was the 
first time that the Supreme Court held that juveniles facing 
prosecution have many of the same legal rights as adults including the 
right to an attorney, the right to remain silent, the right to notice of 
the charges, and the right to a full hearing on the merits of the case.183  
The Fourteenth Amendment is an important source 
of individual rights and liberties.184 The Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause both guarantee the fairness of laws.185 
Substantive due process guarantees that laws will be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and equal protection guarantees fair treatment of similarly 
situated persons alike.186 Courts have struggled in deciding whether 
the due process clause or equal protection framework applies to 
addressing the constitutionality of the right to counsel. Several 
Supreme Court cases explicitly rely on equal protection considerations.   
In Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that while the trial 
court was not required by the federal constitution to provide a right to 
appellate review, the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clause protected the prisoners from invidious discriminations.187 To 
emphasize the volume of economic inequality that hinders a 
defendant’s legal representation in the court room, the Court stated, 
“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets 
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depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be 
afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money 
enough to buy transcripts.”188  The Supreme Court in Gideon also 
distinctively stated, “Any person hauled into court, who is too poor to 
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him.”189 These cases are clear examples of equal protection being 
used to foster protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.   
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has simultaneously applied 
equal protection and due process without a clear distinction from one 
another.190 In Ross v. Moffitt, the Court held “neither the due process 
clause nor the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that a state, after appointing counsel for indigent 
defendants on their first appeal as of right from a conviction, must also 
appoint counsel for further discretionary state court appeals.”191 The 
Supreme Court in Ross also acknowledged that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require absolute equality or precisely equal 
advantages, but conceded:  
 
That the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that a state's criminal appellate 
system be free of unreasoned distinctions, and that 
indigents have an adequate opportunity to present their 
claims fairly within the adversary system; the state cannot 
adopt procedures which leave an indigent entirely cut off 
from any appeal at all by virtue of his indigency, or extend 
to such indigent merely a meaningless ritual while others 
in better economic circumstances have a meaningful 
appeal--the question being one of degrees, not of 
absolutes.192  
 
A court’s approach to address equal protection and due process 
considerations regarding the right to counsel can demonstrate judicial 
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activism or judicial restraint.193 Notwithstanding its holding to refuse 
a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel for discretionary appeals, 
the Supreme Court in Ross still, but vaguely, considers equal 
protection and due process considerations.194 It is important to address 
the Court’s ambiguity for two reasons. First, Raymond, Korey, Antron, 
Kevin, and Yusef, as minority suspects in a high-profile case and 
susceptible to false confessions, are considered a “discrete and insular” 
group.195 Second, they possessed an immutable or highly visible trait. 
Third, they are powerless to protect themselves in a political process; 
the group's distinguishing characteristic does not inhibit it from 
contributing meaningfully to society. Raymond, Korey, Antron, Kevin, 
and Yusef had no prior criminal record.196 Each were born and raised 
in low-income communities in New York City during the 1970s, when 
concentrated poverty deepened economic disparity and fragmented 
race relations between upper class, middle, and lower-class 
residents.197 Concentrated poverty caused more crime, and 
reinforced hostility towards poor people.198 These socioeconomic 
circumstances, taken as a whole, painted the image of crime as the 
work of poor people. The court, notwithstanding the lack of DNA 
evidence sufficient for a conviction, warranted these teenagers as 
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196 Susan Welsh, Keren Schiffman & Enjoli Francis, Looking Back at the 1989 Central Park Jogger Rape 
Case That Led to 5 Teens’ Conviction, Later Vacated, ABC NEWS (May 24, 2019), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/back-1989-central-park-jogger-rape-case-led/story?id=63084663. 
197 Id. 





Journal of Race, Gender, and Ethnicity 
Volume 9 – May 2020 
 
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center 
 
c. Footnote Four’s Focus on Individual Rights. 
 
The term “discrete and insular”, emerged in 1938, is described 
as the “most famous footnote in the U.S. Supreme Court’s history — 
footnote four of Justice Stone’s opinion in United States 
v. Carolene Products Co.199 Carolene Products ended a practice of 
unwarranted judicial activism and restriction of a political process to 
address the unequal distribution of wealth and power.200 The case 
resulted in the discontinued application of heightened scrutiny to 
economic legislation and began consciously protecting discrete and 
insular minorities.201 Justice Stone faded footnote 4, famously stating 
that “legislation aimed at ‘discrete and insular’ minorities without the 
normal protections of the political process would be one exception to 
the presumption of constitutionality and justify heightened standard of 
judicial review.”202 
Footnote four of Carolene Products implies that a court should 
apply stricter scrutiny than rational basis to a law that reflects 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” who may be 
inadequately protected by equal protections of the law and restricted 
from the majoritarian political process.203 The Central Park Jogger 
case demonstrates the socioeconomic disenfranchisement of minorities 
in the criminal justice system, irrespective of the incorporation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.204 Therefore, it is plausible for 
equal protection to apply to produce fair and impartial results in a case 
involving legal representation for minors in criminal trials and monitor 
a court’s degree of judicial discretion.   
Carolene Products influenced equal protection considerations by 
implying that there may be an opportunity to examine more carefully 
any statutes that restrict political processes or violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.205 However, the Court failed to apply heightened scrutiny 
in a situation that warranted the application of footnote four in San 
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Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.206 Notably, in 1972, 
the Supreme Court in Rodriguez rejected a claim for heightened 
scrutiny of unequal financing of Texas public schools.207 The Court 
limited judicial review of equal protection challenges to three 
categories that were necessary to justify extraordinary protection from 
the majoritarian political process.208  A group must be “saddled” by 
“disabilities,” have been subject to “a history of purposeful unequal 




The U.S. Constitution guarantees all citizens individual 
fundamental freedoms and civil rights.210 The Constitution and 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution provide the floor for 
individual rights.211 Although states have the power to pass their 
state’s constitutions and may even afford citizens more rights than 
thoughts guaranteed by the constitution, they may not curtail those 
rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.212 The supremacy clause 
prevents the state and the federal government from interfering with 
each other’s exercise of power.213 However, the Central Park Jogger 
case overlooked early Supreme Court decisions that protected minors’ 
rights and acknowledged the status of minors. The Central Park 
Jogger case is the epitome of a miscarriage of justice, but the criminal 
justice system can learn lessons from it by expanding equal protection 
to minors.  
The poor, as neither a quasi-suspect nor a suspect class under 
the Equal Protection Clause, places a glass ceiling on minors uniquely 
impacted by socioeconomic circumstances. Since Rodriguez, the 
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Supreme Court stated that the poor is not a suspect class.214 But on 
several occasions the Court provided dicta that supports the notion 
under factual pleadings and evidence, that poverty might constitute a 
suspect class.215  To properly decide this issue, the Court would need to 
carefully assess several factors in determining whether a particular 
group should be treated as a quasi-suspect or suspect class under 
Equal Protection Clause.216 The Court must examine poverty through 
discourse on race, ethnicity, and gender to address the structural 
nature of poverty that disproportionately harms minorities more than 
other ethnic groups.217 This approach permits the Court to determine 
whether there are legitimate reasons for the government to treat 
members of a group differently than other individuals, whether 
members of the group have immutable characteristics; whether federal 
and state legislation reflects a continuing antipathy or prejudice 
against the group; whether the group is politically powerless in its 
ability to attract the attention of lawmakers; and whether there are 
principled ways to distinguish the group from other similar groups who 
might seek heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause.218 
Minorities unfairly impacted by the criminal justice system can 
demonstrate a complete deprivation of education and other indicia of 
income discrimination. But because there is a demand for extending 
protection for minorities, considering poverty factors can reinforce 
factual pleadings and evidence of a minority group’s effect from 
poverty. 
The present system of allocating assigned counsel from a public 
defender does not constitutionally guarantee equal protection under 
the law.219 That is, those who can privately retain their own counsel 
are more likely to be acquitted than those who cannot, creating 
unequal access to counsel.220 A feasible approach to transforming the 
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equal right to counsel into the right to equal counsel, courts should 
emulate 18 U.S.C. 3005, where a “learned” counsel must provide legal 
representation. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. 3005 for death penalty 
cases, where a defendant is assigned to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment along with a learned counsel representation in capital 
cases.221 To be considered “learned,” an attorney must have experience 
“in the trial, appeal, or post-conviction review” of federal or state death 
penalty cases.222 A lawyer’s responsibility in death penalty cases may 
be comparable to her or his responsibility in representing minors.223 
For instance, the attorney must develop a meaningful relationship 
with a child who, like the boys in the Central Park Jogger case, is 
likely the target of public and media animosity whose unpopularity 
may taint the quality of that relationship.224 But one common issue in 
death penalty cases and the Central Park Jogger case is the quality of 
representation afforded to defendants. U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg supported a moratorium on the death penalty 
and criticized the insufficient funding available for defendants.225 She 
stated, “I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the 
Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the 
defendant was well represented at trial.”226 Similarly, to the 
inadequate representation of trial attorneys on capital cases, the 
Central Park Jogger case demonstrates inadequate counsel where 
none of the three defense attorneys cross-examined Meili in the first 
trial involving Antron McCray, Yusef Salaam and Raymond 
Santana.227  
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with a gap of P.L. 116-113). 
222 See Rosie Gorn, Adequate Representation: The Difference Between Life and Death, GEORGETOWN 
AMERICAN CRIM. L. REV. (2018). 
223 Individual Justices and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/united-states-supreme-court/individual-justices. 
224 PERLIN, supra note 164. 
225 Individual Justices and the Death Penalty, supra note 223. 
226 Id. 







Journal of Race, Gender, and Ethnicity 
Volume 9 – May 2020 
 
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center 
 
Courts can also look to incorporating guardian ad litum into 
cases like the Central Park Jogger. Guardian ad litem is appointed to 
represent the legal interests of a person appointed by a court to 
represent the interest of a child in family court proceedings.228 One is 
often appointed to represent a child's interest when a parent would not 
be able to represent the interests of the child without a conflict of 
interest, or the interests of an orphaned child in the probate of the 
estate of the child's last surviving parent.229 Judges also appoint 
guardian ad litem for a minor lacking mental capacity in court.230 
Because minors are distinguishable from adults and lack political 
power due to their developmental, mental capacities, they make up a 
portion of innocent defendants wrongfully convicted by the criminal 
justice system.231 Thus, minors wrongfully accused of crimes would 
benefit from a learned counsel and an appointed counsel to represent 
their best interest.  
Some lawmakers have passed laws that require mandatory 
video recording for all confessions.232 Interrogation reform requires 
police officers, prosecutors, and judges to exercise discretion. 
Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding 
since it “threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the 
prosecutor's motives and decision making to outside inquiry,” and 
potentially undermines prosecutorial effectiveness.233 Although 
prosecutors play a dominant and commanding role in the criminal 
justice system through the exercise of broad unchecked discretion, they 
can use their power and discretion to reform the system.234 Prosecutors 
can exercise discretion to construct effective solutions, and while they 
 
228 JOHN BOUVLER, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY VOL. 1: ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF HE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (6th ed. 1856).  
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Domanico, Cicchini & White, supra note 105. 
232 New York State Law Requiring Video Recording if Interrogations Takes Effect, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://innocenceproject.org/new-york-state-law-video-recording-interrogations-takes-effect/. 
233 Davis, supra note 162. 





Journal of Race, Gender, and Ethnicity 
Volume 9 – May 2020 
 
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center 
 
are granted broad discretion to enforce criminal laws, discretion cannot 
violate equal protection principles.235 
Equal protection considerations currently do and should 
continue to hold prosecutors accountable.236 Courts have upheld and 
sanctioned the misuse of prosecutorial discretion, but made it 
challenging for defendants to establish a prima facie finding to 
discretionary decisions that have a discriminatory effect on African-
American criminal defendants and crime victims.237 These challenges 
are usually brought as selective prosecution claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause, requiring a nearly impossible showing that the 
prosecutor intentionally discriminated against the defendant or the 
victim.238 A challenge in meeting this standard is that much of the 
discriminatory treatment of defendants and victims may be based on 
unconscious racism and institutional bias rather than on 
discriminatory intent.239 The culture of over criminalizing poverty, 
along with the mass media coverage of Meili and the prosecution of the 
five boys, produces and socially constructs race, class, and gender bias 
in criminal court.240 Media is a form of social institution in which 
Gramsci argued is an avenue for the dominant group to spread 
ideologies—beliefs, assumptions, and values—to socialize people into 
the norms, values and beliefs of the dominant group.241  A clear 
example of hegemony is that the mass media’s portrayal of all five teen 
suspects in the era of the overcriminalization of poverty reflected 
confirmation bias. The public perceived information on the five teens 
as low-income minority youths roaming the streets looking for trouble; 
it affirmed the public’s existing racial stereotypes, while overlooking 
data that contradicts those beliefs, and reinforced the unequal 
treatment of law enforcement and the prosecutors over non-white 
residents. 242 
 
235 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).  
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Courts, legislators, and scholars have acknowledged that there 
are many factors that account for the wrongful convictions of indigent 
citizens, such as the lack of competent counsel, police misconduct, and 
prosecutorial discretion, that stem from economic inequality.243 It is 
important to note that our nation’s shift from a welfare state to a 
security state, coupled with the law enforcement’s surveillance on 
minorities, has led to higher rates of crime and poverty.244 Our nation’s 
transition demonstrates that the criminal justice system benefits the 
rich, not the poor:  
Both police officers and lawyers are essential to the 
individual’s legal protections. It is a hypocrisy to 
acknowledge everyone’s right to equal protection under the 
law by the police and then to allocate protection under the 
law by lawyers on the basis of what individuals can pay. As 
long as this continues, we cannot claim that there is 
anything like equal treatment before the laws in the 
criminal justice system.245  
The connection between poverty and minority status traces back to 
Gramsci’s framework on cultural hegemony, where the criminal justice 
system subjugates citizens based on a class distinction between upper-
class and lower-class citizens.246 Minority children lack the political 
process since they have no control over the historical and 
socioeconomic circumstances that limit their autonomy in the criminal 
justice system.247 Likewise, the Central Park Five were minors who 
became products of cultural hegemony that occurred in the 1970s that 
led to the erosion of equality of rights for minorities. The Central Park 
Five, and minors alike, continue to have no control over the cultural 
hegemony that changed the cultural norms and ideology on society’s 
view on economic equality during the 1970s and 80s. 
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To many, the overrepresentation of minorities in false confession 
and wrongful convictions cases in the criminal justice system is a 
problem found only in history books. However, the truth is that 
children are still prone to contact with the criminal justice system due 
to their socioeconomic status beyond their control. The welfare of 
children must always be the court’s paramount consideration. The 
Central Park Jogger case serves as a demand to break the glass ceiling 
for minority children currently impacted by the nation’s cultural 
hegemony that fostered disenfranchisement of minority men and 
women in the 1980s and 1990’s.248 The theory and application of equal 
protection to expand the right of counsel for minors would mitigate the 
residual effects of our nation’s shift from a welfare state to a security 
state.249 Perhaps one place to start is by looking back at the Warren 
Court’s jurisprudence. According to historian Bernard Schwartz, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren’s jurisprudence worked best when the political 
institutions defaulted on their responsibility to address and remedy 
problems such as segregation, reapportionment, and cases where the 
constitutional rights of defendants were abused.250 Justice Warren’s 
belief, along with John Rawl’s philosophy echoes our nation’s 
recognized principle: equal justice under the law.251 Our nation must 
take broader views on equal protection. Therefore, children who 
patently have no control over the socioeconomic circumstances require 
judicial intervention as a basis under equal protection of rights to 




248 Lopez, supra note 69. 
249 BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 40. 
250 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51. 
251 RAWLS, supra note 1. 
